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In this paper, we examine a series of questions about bilateral trade flows 
in the light of a rich and up-to-date panel data set. The analyses performed 
reveal that (1) globalization process has been functioning in a number of 
ways, (2) functioning of economic regions display alternative results based 
on model specification, (3) distance is an important factor in the functioning 
of economic regions, (4) trade relationships do strengthen when countries 
move toward stronger degrees of their regimes, regardless of democratic or 
autocratic, (5) the same polity direction implies a higher degree of trade 
between countries, (6) given the joint regime strength (common direction of 
regimes) of trade partners, common direction of regimes (higher joint 
regime strength) implies lower trade, (7) partners belonging to the same 
religion trade less, (8) partners with the same language trade more among 
themselves, (9) given that partners are of the same religion (language), 
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1.Introduction 
Two versions of an introductory section could have been written for this paper: a version 
which is honest, and a version which is compatible with scientific/technical writing. Here we 
will start with the honest version. Then we will re-cast the elements of the honest version to 
form a technical version: the motivation for this paper was set when we were writing 
Cunedioglu and Yucel (2010) in search of an answer for the question of whether the 
Mediterranean defines an economic region. In Cunedioglu and Yucel (2010) we sufficed with 
a descriptive approach while defending our thesis that “Mediterranean does not really 
constitute an economic region”. Despite our best efforts and technical integrity, we believed 
that some further elaboration of the issues within an empirical framework is necessary to get 
a better-qualified answer. Consequently, in order to obtain an econometric representation of 
the issues in Cunedioglu and Yucel (2010) we compiled a large data set with pairwise 
combinations of 130 countries times 48 years. 
The reader will probably agree that the cost of forming a panel data set of such 
dimensions exceeds the expected empirical benefits if we have restricted ourselves with the 
Mediterranean-specific questions. Unless we extend the coverage of analysis, ask more 
questions and exploit the compiled data set in other possible directions, existence of such a 
database could not have been justified. This is the first reason behind gathering a series of 
questions in the same project. 
A second reason is related to the dynamics of empirical research: During our preliminary 
analysis of the data, we encountered a number of technical issues. Among these, the 
treatment of globalization takes the first place. Did globalization contribute to higher volumes 
of bilateral trade? If yes, through what specific channel? In order to get correct answers for 
our main question of the Mediterranean in relation to other regions, the obvious direction was 
to include the effects of globalization in our models. So we obtained an empirical picture of 
what globalization did. The second issue was the treatment of fixed effects within a panel 
framework. After some couple of preliminary rounds of estimation, we obtained some long 
lists of fixed effects in our simple gravity specification which indeed were hard to present to 
the reader. Once we thought about the ways to present our findings, the fixed effect 
summary representation of the upcoming sections appeared as a viable solution. Digging 
further this representation of findings, we realized that this was a quite meaningful device to 
pinpoint economic regions; not the pre-defined economic regions, but the de facto ones. 
Finally, in order to better understand what is actually happening in our data set, we enriched 
the analysis by adding a number of institutional and cultural variables. At the end, the 
analysis itself grew beyond our initial purposes and it provided us with some by-products.  
All in all, we have been left with a bundle of findings that can be marketed in two ways. 
First, we could report each finding under a different title and end up with three separate yet 
interrelated papers. Second, we could report all findings under a single title as separate 
sections. The latter was preferred in order to avoid duplication. 
As promised at the beginning, there is also a technical version of the introduction: 
In this paper, we aim to investigate certain questions of international trade. These 
questions are about (1) role of globalization to generate further trade between countries, (2) 
functioning of economic regions, (3) potentials of selected economic regions, like the 
Mediterranean, (4) effects of institutional aspects of countries on trade flows and (5) effects 
of cultural linkages between countries on their trade relationships. These questions are 
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investigated by means of gravity equations. Owing to its simplicity and good performance, 
gravity framework established the natural laboratory to study our questions. Despite the 
approach lost its appeal for some time, it resurrected in some recent studies. 
The main advantage of this paper comes from the dimensions of data employed. Bilateral 
relationships among 130 countries spread over a long time period (from 1962 to 2009) allow 
us to test several hypotheses with regard to the five questions mentioned above. The 
analyses performed reveal that (1) globalization process has been functioning in a number of 
ways, (2) functioning of economic regions display alternative results based on model 
specification, (3) distance is an important factor in the functioning of economic regions, (4) 
trade relationships do strengthen when countries move toward stronger degrees of their 
regimes, regardless of democratic or autocratic, (5) the same polity direction implies a higher 
degree of trade between countries, (6) given the joint regime strength (common direction of 
regimes) of trade partners, common direction of regimes (higher joint regime strength) 
implies lower trade, (7) partners belonging to the same religion trade less, (8) partners with 
the same language trade more among themselves, (10) given that partners are of the same 
religion (language), same language (religion) implies lower trade. 
The next section introduces our empirical framework. In Section 3, we present our 
findings. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Gravity Approach at a Glance 
The gravity approach has been popular for statistical analysis of bilateral flows between 
geographical entities. The historical roots of the approach are in Newton’s formal proposition 
of the Law of Universal Gravitation (Newton, 1687): two physical objects attract each other 
with a force proportional to the mass of each object and disproportional with the squared 
distance separating them. Tinbergen (1962) proposed that the same form could be used in 
assessing international trade flows. In the original expression of the Law of Universal 
Gravitation, G stands for the gravitational constant, iM  and jM  are masses of the two 
interacting objects, and ijD  is the distance separating the objects. Finally, the attractive force 
between the objects is quantified as 2/ ijjiij DMGMF = . The economic version of this 
expression can be written as: θβα ijjiij DMGMF /= . In this expression, ijF is the flow from 
origin i  to destination j , or total volume of interactions between i and j . iM  and jM  are the 
relevant economic sizes and ijD stands for the center-to-center distance between i and j . 
The gravity equation can be re-stated in natural logarithms to obtain a linear relationship. 
The inclusion of an error term yields an equation that can be estimated through known 
techniques. This framework is one of the most successful empirical models in economics: a 
good portion of the variation in trade flows is explained with an equation where the 
coefficients are economically sensible, and statistically well determined (Frankel, 1997). 
Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) report that the identification of distance effects on bilateral 
trade is one of the clearest and most robust empirical findings in economics. 
The baseline (standard) gravity equation can be expressed as follows: 
εββββ ++++=+ DYYYYXX pcjpcijijiij ln]ln[]ln[]ln[ 3210  (1) 
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where, ijX  is the exports from country i  to country j ; iY  is the GDP of country i ; pciY  is the 
GDP per capita in country i ; D  is the geographical distance; and ε  stands for the error 
term. 
The dependent variable is the logarithmic sum of bilateral exports. The logarithmic product 
of gross domestic products is the major scale variable; e.g. the volume of trade is assumed 
to be proportional with the combined economic size of the trade partners. GDP per capita is 
a measure of product differentiation as well as specialization. Trade costs are captured by 
the geographical distance. It is also an indicator of the costs of cultural differences that tend 
to increase with geographic distance. This version was employed by, for instance, Frankel 
and Rose (2002). 
The standard gravity equation is subject to some criticisms though (Baldwin, 2006; 
Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). First of all, omitted variables such as relative trade costs and 
effects of relative prices do bias the standard gravity equation estimates. Note that these 
omitted effects are not time-invariant. Secondly, the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the average trade between country pairs. However, this representation yields a distorted 
quantification when the trade between two countries is unbalanced. Finally, the trade flows 
on the left hand side are deflated by an appropriate price index, such as the US consumer 
prices or the available international export price indices. Since these indices have secular 
trends over long time horizons, economic variables which are deflated by these indices 
induce a spurious correlation. In light of these, an improved version of gravity equation can 
be stated as: 
εδββββ +++++=+ ZDYYYYXX pcjpcijijiij ln]ln[]ln[]ln[ 3210  (2) 
where the additional vector of variables ( Z ) address the above-mentioned criticisms. This 
representation of gravity equation is maintained in the following section. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
Analysis in this section is fairly simple and straightforward: as the first step, we estimate 
our baseline specification of Equation 1. This is nothing but a restricted version of Equation 2 
with δ  is set to zero. The baseline specification is especially important in the case of gravity 
estimation of bilateral trade flows, since all the subsequent analyses become worthless in the 
absence of a solid verification of the baseline gravity model. Estimates of the baseline 
specification (δ =0) are given in Table 2. Regardless of the estimation technique, the 
baseline specification is well-behaving: the mass equivalent (YREAL) has positive and 
significant coefficients, YPCREAL is significant and distance (L) has its desired negative sign 
with statistical significance. 
Upon this baseline specification, we develop a series of exercises. In each case, Z is 
changed so as to include a different set of variables. As described in the subsequent 
sections each re-estimated model is designated to address a different question. Note that we 
omitted testing of random versus fixed effects; yet provided a rich set of alternative 
specifications to allow the reader to capture various aspects of the data. 
Role of Globalization 
Globalization, by definition and tautologically, is expected to have a considerable impact 
on bilateral trade flows. This nature of globalization, nevertheless, does not dismiss its 
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analytical value. Hence we consider an array of specifications to understand what is 
happening in the globalization front. The results of these exercises are provided in Table 3, 
Table 4 and Table 5. 
The first exercise regarding globalization is fairly raw, as we simply include a group of 
globalization dummies in our regressions to measure the effects of globalization (Table 3). 
The variables GLOB4 and GLOBFC are included in all cases in order to account for the 
latest and mostly financial episode of globalization (GLOB4: from 2000 to 2005 including 
endpoints) and the global financial crisis (GLOBFC: from 2007 to 2009 including endpoints). 
On top of these and the baseline gravity variables we also add, in turn, GLOB3 and GLOB31 
which respectively cover periods after 1980 and 1990. Table 3 yields the following: 
Observation 1: There is no one-way conclusion toward the sign of GLOB4; that is, 
evidence regarding the latest and most financial episode of globalization is mixed. 
Observation 2: GLOBFC possesses a negative and significant coefficient in all 
specifications, which is indeed quite expected as bilateral trade flows were dampened 
at all during the last global crisis. This finding, still, has no value beyond effectively 
controlling our regression relationships. 
Observation 3: Regardless of how we have defined the start of the period in which 
globalization gained a tremendous momentum (i.e. after 1980 or 1990), globalization 
has a negative impact on average bilateral trade flows. 
Pausing for a while, observation 1 and observation 2 do not yield a problem; yet 
observation 3 does: how can GLOB3 and GLOB31 assume significantly negative coefficient 
estimates while the fundamental motto of globalization is enhanced trade relationships 
worldwide? In order to proceed safely, one should have a good response to this question. As 
a matter of fact, the failure of Table 3 estimates in addressing the functioning of globalization 
is a result of letting globalization dummies to only affect the intercept term. A better 
estimation setup should consider not only the intercept effects but also the slope (or gradient) 
effects. Table 4 and Table 5 serve this purpose. 
Observation 4: Both GLOB3 and GLOB31 have negative and significant coefficient 
estimates in Table 4 and Table 5 but their interactions with YREAL have significant 
positive coefficient estimates. 
Observation 5: Interactions of GLOB3 and GLOB31 with YPCREAL (Table 5) have 
significant negative coefficient estimates. 
Observation 4 clarifies our previous question of reverse-functioning globalization: 
globalization seems to have worked in a way to decrease the importance of linkages 
unrelated to income while underlining the importance of national incomes of trade partners. A 
higher joint income of trade partners yields higher bilateral volumes of trade. The same is not 
valid for per capita incomes. In the age of globalization, higher per capita incomes imply 
lower volumes of bilateral volumes of trade. If we interpret the coefficient of the product per 
capita income as a sign of quality-inclination, the negative coefficient of globalization-per 
capita income interaction indicate that the total trade-avoidance impact is higher for richer 
country pairs as compared to poorer ones. 
Revealed Functioning of Economic Regions 
As mentioned at the very beginning, whether groups of countries with well-established 
historical or geographical ties do actually form economic regions is one of the key questions 
of this study. In order to develop an answer to this question, we simply have resorted to 
estimates of fixed effects in a panel setup. The exercise is quite straightforward: we estimate 
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the baseline gravity specification without explicit reference to regions or country groups. 
Then we get the fixed effect estimates for each cross-section, namely for each pair of 
countries. A positive fixed effect estimate is interpreted as an indication of “above-average” 
of “augmented/strong” trade relationship between the respective pair of countries. So the rest 
of the exercise is based on a counting exercise, as demonstrated in Table 6. 
Table 6-A (Panel A of Table 6) summarizes the number of positive fixed effects for each 
pair of country groups, where the grand sum is normalized to 10,000 for simplicity. We avoid 
deriving conclusions on the basis of Table 6-A since each pair of country groups has a 
different number of potential bilateral linkages; i.e. a higher number of positive fixed effects is 
possible when two large groups of countries are considered. In Table 6-B the figures of Table 
6-A are repeated in terms of “multiples of the minimum” without avoiding the counting bias of 
Table 6-A. The figures in Table 6-C reflect a clearer picture: In Table 6-C, figures of Table 6-
A are standardized by using the total number of bilateral linkages between the country 
groups considered where the results are expressed in percentage terms. 
Note that the lack of an explicit reference to pre-defined regions or country groups in 
estimation allows us to use the term “revealed”. By means of the panel fixed effect estimates, 
we try to confirm how well-defined the pre-defined regions are. Based on the counting 
exercise described, we have the following: 
Observation 6: In terms of fostering strong internal trade relationships (e.g. having 
positive fixed effects) the ordering of the regions is: (1) EU15-Mediterranean countries 
[90%], (2) Mediterranean-OIC countries [89%], (3) East Asian countries [83%], (4) EU15 
countries [78%], (5) Latin-Caribbean countries [64%], (6) Ex-Communist countries 
[50%], (7) other countries [48%], (8) Mediterranean countries [40%], (9) OIC countries 
[38%] and (10) OIC-Ex-Communist countries [30%]. 
Observation 7: If we maintain one-half as our (natural) benchmark, the regions that 
actually reveal themselves through trade relationships are EU15-Mediterranean 
countries, Mediterranean-OIC countries, East Asian countries, EU15 countries, Latin-
Caribbean countries and the ex-Communist countries. 
Observation 8: The Mediterranean countries (non-EU and non-OIC), OIC countries 
(non-Mediterranean and non-ex-Communist) and OIC-ex-Communist countries fail to 
develop good internal trade relationships. 
Trade Performance and Potential of Selected Economic Regions 
These observations of the previous sub-section establish the ground for further 
examination of regions in shaping bilateral trade flows. These analyses are not only in terms 
of geographical definitions of regions, but also do they consider institutional and cultural 
proximity. This subsection is devoted to a straightforward analysis of regions whereas the 
other extensions are covered by the last two sub-sections. 
Table 7 and Table 8 display our panel estimates with special emphasis placed on Asian 
countries (ASIA), EU countries (EU), ex-Communist countries (EXCOM), Latin-Caribbean 
countries (LAT), Mediterranean countries (MED) and Organization of the Islamic Conference 
member countries (OIC). For each, the intra-region linkages as well as the linkages with the 
extra-region countries are considered in regressions. In the tables the intra-region is denoted 
with REG-REG and linkages with extra-region are denoted with REG-NON-REG. 
Observation 9: Based on Table 7, ASIA is successful in terms of developing both intra-
region and extra-region trade relationships. EU has a deficiency in terms of developing 
intra-region relationships yet it has good extra-region linkages. EXCOM and LAT has 
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just the reverse picture of EU. MED and OIC, finally, has low performance in terms of 
generating both intra-region and extra-region trade relationships. 
In Table 8, we regenerate the estimates of Table 7 by including the REG-REG and REG-
NON-REG also in interaction with distance (L) in an attempt to control the effects of 
geographical distance. This changes the previous observation as follows: 
Observation 10: Based on Table 8, OIC is successful in terms of developing both intra-
region and extra-region trade relationships. EXCOM and LAT have good intra-region 
trade linkages where they fail to do so in terms of extra-region linkages. ASIA, EU and 
MED fail to yield both strong intra-region and extra-region trade relationships. 
Observation 11: The role of distance (in interaction form) in Table 8 is interesting: in 
the cases of ASIA, EU and MED increasing distance help developing better trade 
relationships. For EXCOM and OIC the picture is the opposite. For LAT, the intra-region 
linkages get weaker as distance increases yet distance has no effect on extra-region 
relationships. 
Institutional Congruence and Bilateral Trade 
In order to assess the role of institutions and institutional congruence between trade 
partners on trade flows, we device some variables based on the POLITYIV database. 
DURABLE is a measure of common regime durability in trade partners, POLITY is a common 
degree of trade partners’ regimes and DIRECPOLITY is an indicator variable measuring 
whether the regimes of trade partners have the same direction, e.g. whether they are both 
democratic or autocratic (see Appendix B for detailed definitions of variables). 
We present our estimates with institutional/regime-specific variables in Table 9. In this 
exercise the estimates do not display a high similarity. Rather they depend more on 
specification of the panel effects. Intuitively we highlight the ones with fixed cross-section 
effects with the expectation that coefficients of the institutional variables would be more 
reliable once the cross-section effects are controlled for. 
Observation 12: Second and fourth columns of Table 9 suggest that DURABLE 
(product regime durability) is not significant. POLITY (product absolute polity scores) 
has a significant positive coefficient indicating that trade relationships do strengthen 
when countries move toward stronger degrees of their regimes, regardless of 
democratic or autocratic. 
Observation 13: The same polity direction (both democratic or both autocratic) implies 
a higher degree of trade between countries (see Yu(2010) and Aidt and 
Gassebner(2010) for opposite finding). 
Observation 14: The interaction of POLITY and DIRECPOLITY has a significant 
negative coefficient estimate indicating that (1) when POLITY is given, the same 
direction of regimes implies lower trade, (2) when DIRECPOLITY is given, increasing 
power of regimes imply lower trade. 
The other columns in Table 9 provide mixed evidence on bilateral trade linkages in 
relation to institutional/regime-specific characteristics and they are displayed for the 
interested reader. 
Cultural Congruence and Bilateral Trade 
In order to have quantitative indicators of culture we resort to language and religion at the 
cost of over-simplification. DSAMERLG and DSAMELNG indicate common religion and 
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common language of trade partners. These variables are included in our models individually 
as well as with their interaction. The findings of Table 10 are quite regular. 
Observation 15: Partners belonging to the same religion trade less among themselves. 
Observation 16: Partners with the same language trade more among themselves. 
Observation 17: Given that partners are of the same religion (language), same 
language (religion) implies lower trade. 
At the end, Table 11 and Table 12 are intended to measure the combined effects of region 
information and our proxies of culture specifically for EU and MED. However, the evidence 
provided in these tables lacks regularity to a large extent, so we avoided elaborating these 
tables while keeping them in the text for the interested reader. 
4. Discussion 
In this study, we re-examined world trade flows from a gravity perspective. Owing to its 
strong background philosophy and well-behaving econometric properties gravity approach 
was indeed a good choice. Indeed, it is nothing but the very intuition of the framework was 
what allowed us to develop an array of findings that looked clear-cut. At the cost of 
straightforward repetition, our analyses revealed that (1) globalization process has been 
functioning in a number of ways, (2) functioning of economic regions display alternative 
results based on model specification, (3) distance is an important factor in the functioning of 
economic regions, (4) trade relationships do strengthen when countries move toward 
stronger degrees of their regimes, regardless of democratic or autocratic, (5) the same polity 
direction implies a higher degree of trade between countries, (6) given the joint regime 
strength (common direction of regimes) of trade partners, common direction of regimes 
(higher joint regime strength) implies lower trade, (7) partners belonging to the same religion 
trade less, (8) partners with the same language trade more among themselves, (10) given 
that partners are of the same religion (language), same language (religion) implies lower 
trade. 
However, some deficiencies of the econometric analyses presented in the study should 
also be mentioned. First of all, despite the statistical framework have its roots in classical 
physics its economic meaning is established indirectly; simply there is no underlying 
behavioral and/or optimization problem. Second, once the analysis resorts to an immense 
data set which has the potential to yield unexpectedly significant estimates. At the same 
time, dimensionality of the same data set packs the econometric control issues in a black 
box. This is especially valid when we try to investigate the impacts of several categorical 
variables in the same specification. Finally, the very nature of globalization makes 
international trade to run in an increasingly intra-industry manner mostly under the control of 
multinational corporations or conglomerates. Hence it is a difficult task to assure the reader 
of what she is reading is actually a tangible set of findings. In what follows, we elaborate the 
controversial aspects of our findings. 
The first problem is about the nature of globalization and it has two dimensions: the first is 
about the trade-facilitating mechanism of globalization. Globalization is expected to foster 
further trade, yet we are unable to observe this unless we interact globalization dummy 
variables with the product national income and product per capita income. The second 
dimension is about the effects of the most recent episode of globalization, i.e. from 2000 to 
2005, about which we do not obtain a one-way conclusion. In terms of sub-periods, only the 
last global financial crisis yielded intuitive coefficient estimates. 
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The second problem surrounding the current analysis is about the treatment of 
institutional and cultural variables. For both classes of variables, the findings are salutary yet 
they are far from being widely accurate. Based on our treatment of institutional variables, 
joint regime durability in trade partners has no effect on their trade linkages. Instead we 
observe that joint strength of their regimes support deeper trade relationships. Upon this, 
when they have the same regime direction they enjoy higher trade. The interaction of regime 
strengths and directions, however, complicates the picture: for a given level of joint regime 
strength, similar regimes tend to yield lower bilateral trade. Equivalently, when we know that 
two countries are of the same regime type their trade decreases as joint strength of regimes 
increases. In other words, the non-linear part of our specification is not congruent with the 
linear part. A similar structure is valid for the cultural proxies, namely language and religion. 
The analysis of the “revealed economic regions” seems to have established the core 
value of our analysis. Based on the fixed effects estimates of the standard gravity 
specification, we could identify the pre-defined regions that actually establish good trade 
relationships among themselves. Mediterranean members of the EU15, Mediterranean 
countries which are also OIC members, East Asian countries, EU15 countries, Latin-
Caribbean countries and ex-Communist countries do have good trade intra-relationships. 
The Mediterranean countries (non-EU and non-OIC), OIC countries (non-Mediterranean and 
non-ex-Communist) and OIC-ex-Communist countries fail to develop good internal trade 
relationships. These findings were also augmented by further estimates. A thorough study of 
the regions and their trade relationships then looks like an interesting venue of further 
research. 
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Appendix A: List of Countries 
The following 130 countries are included in the study with varying time spans: [1]Algeria, [2]Angola, [3]Argentina, 
[4]Australia, [5]Austria, [6]Azerbaijan, [7]Bahamas, The, [8]Bahrain, [9]Bangladesh, [10]Belarus, [11]Belgium, 
[12]Bolivia, [13]Bosnia and Herzegovina, [14]Botswana, [15]Brazil, [16]Brunei Darussalam, [17]Bulgaria, 
[18]Cambodia, [19]Cameroon, [20]Canada, [21]Chile, [22]China, [23]Colombia, [24]Congo, Dem. Rep., [25]Costa 
Rica, [26]Cote d'Ivoire, [27]Croatia, [28]Cyprus, [29]Czech Republic, [30]Denmark, [31]Dominican Republic, 
[32]Ecuador, [33]Egypt, Arab Rep., [34]El Salvador, [35]Estonia, [36]Ethiopia, [37]Finland, [38]France, [39]French 
Polynesia, [40]Gabon, [41]Georgia, [42]Germany, [43]Ghana, [44]Greece, [45]Guatemala, [46]Guinea, [47]Haiti, 
[48]Honduras, [49]Hong Kong SAR, China, [50]Hungary, [51]Iceland, [52]India, [53]Indonesia, [54]Iran, Islamic 
Rep., [55]Iraq, [56]Ireland, [57]Israel, [58]Italy, [59]Jamaica, [60]Japan, [61]Jordan, [62]Kazakhstan, [63]Kenya, 
[64]Korea, Rep., [65]Kuwait, [66]Latvia, [67]Lebanon, [68]Libya, [69]Lithuania, [70]Luxembourg, [71]Macao SAR, 
China, [72]Macedonia, FYR, [73]Madagascar, [74]Malaysia, [75]Malta, [76]Mauritius, [77]Mexico, [78]Morocco, 
[79]Mozambique, [80]Namibia, [81]Nepal, [82]Netherlands, [83]New Caledonia, [84]New Zealand, [85]Nicaragua, 
[86]Nigeria, [87]Norway, [88]Oman, [89]Pakistan, [90]Panama, [91]Papua New Guinea, [92]Paraguay, [93]Peru, 
[94]Philippines, [95]Poland, [96]Portugal, [97]Qatar, [98]Romania, [99]Russian Federation, [100]Saudi Arabia, 
[101]Senegal, [102]Serbia, [103]Singapore, [104]Slovak Republic, [105]Slovenia, [106]South Africa, [107]Spain, 
[108]Sri Lanka, [109]Sudan, [110]Sweden, [111]Switzerland, [112]Syrian Arab Republic, [113]Tanzania, 
[114]Thailand, [115]Trinidad and Tobago, [116]Tunisia, [117]Turkey, [118]Uganda, [119]Ukraine, [120]United 
Arab Emirates, [121]United Kingdom, [122]United States, [123]Uruguay, [124]Uzbekistan, [125]Venezuela, RB, 
[126]Vietnam, [127]West Bank and Gaza, [128]Yemen, Rep., [129]Zambia, [130]Zimbabwe. 
Appendix B: Data Sources and Transformations 
Trade flows 
TRDREAL: Export (f.o.b.) data are taken from UN COMTRADE, United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
Database. Each export flow was transformed into real terms by mean of appropriate deflators. For each country 
pair, the trade volume (gravitational force) was calculated as the sum of reciprocal real exports. 
National income and population 
YREAL and YPCREAL: Real GDP and the real per capita GDP data are taken from WDI, World Development 
Indicators, International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). For each country pair, a 
common measure of income (physical mass in product form) was calculated as the product of each country’s 
income. The same applies to the per capita income. 
Distances 
L: Geographical distance data are taken from CEPII, natural logarithms. 
Globalization 
GLOB4: Period from 2000 to 2005 including endpoints. 
GLOBFC: Period from 2007 to 2009 including endpoints – indicates the global financial crisis. 
GLOB3: Period after 1980. 
GLOB31: Period after 1990. 
Regions 
Dummy variables for regions and economic communities were derived based on common knowledge. 
Governance/Polity 
Polity variables are taken from POLITY IV Database, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
DURABLE: Natural logarithm of one plus the product of individual regime durability scores. 
POLITY: Natural logarithm of one plus the product of absolute values of individual POLITY scores. 
DIRECPOLITY: Dummy variable taking the value of one if the regimes are similar (both democratic or both 
autocratic). 
Culture 
Language data are taken from Macalester College Department of Economics, Western Hemispheric Research 
Resources, http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Data/Gravity/language.txt 
Religion data are taken from World Religion Database, http://www.worldreligiondatabase.org/ 
DSAMELNG: Dummy variable taking the value of one if the partner countries have the same language. 
DSAMERLG: Dummy variable taking the value of one if the partner countries have the same religion. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Panel Attributes 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
TRDREAL YREAL YPCREAL L  
Mean 16.1327 48.8436 16.2590 8.6672  
Median 16.4611 48.6777 16.2777 8.8983  
Maximum 26.7539 59.3519 21.5872 9.8945  
Minimum 
-0.9942 40.0725 9.8659 4.1743  
Std.Dev. 3.5168 2.4812 2.0403 0.8254  
Skewness 
-0.3758 0.3300 -0.1134 -1.1107  
Kurtosis 2.9646 3.0499 2.5690 4.2271  
Jarque-Bera 4417.1 3417.7 1850.0 50238.8  
Prob(Jarque-Bera) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Number of observations 187207 187207 187207 187207  
      
 
GLOB4 GLOBFC GLOB3 GLOB31 DURABLE 
Mean 0.2106 0.0952 0.7831 0.6089 4.8409 
Median 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 5.3423 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 10.3685 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Std.Dev. 0.4077 0.2936 0.4120 0.4879 2.4666 
Skewness 1.4194 2.7569 -1.3743 -0.4466 -0.6990 
Kurtosis 3.0147 8.6006 2.8888 1.1995 2.6628 
Jarque-Bera 65587.0 502706.6 61589.2 32877.1 14983.4 
Prob(Jarque-Bera) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 195319 195319 195319 195319 173853 
      
 
POLITY DIRECPOLITY DSAMELNG DSAMERLG  
Mean 3.7799 0.5685 0.1082 0.5123  
Median 4.1108 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000  
Maximum 4.6151 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000  
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Std.Dev. 0.9079 0.4952 0.3106 0.4998  
Skewness 
-2.0846 -0.2766 2.5225 -0.0495  
Kurtosis 8.1755 1.0765 7.3632 1.0024  
Jarque-Bera 314131.0 28489.5 362081.7 32553.2  
Prob(Jarque-Bera) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Number of observations 170687 170687 195319 195319  
 
Attributes of the Panel Data Set 
Number of cross-sections 7932   
Number of periods (1962-2009) 48   
Total number of lines in data set 375,168 100.00%  
Maximum number of usable observations 187,207 43.52%  
Minimum number of usable observations 163,310 49.89%  
Note: The data set is available from authors upon request for academic purposes. 
§
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Table 2 
Baseline Gravity Specifications 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Regressors ZS1 ZS2 ZS3 ZS4 ZS5 ZS6 
CONSTANT -25.5445 
(0.000) 
-17.2168 
(0.000) 
-27.0255 
(0.000) 
-47.5990 
(0.000) 
-18.3647 
(0.000) 
-26.5884 
(0.000) 
YREAL 1.0379 
(0.000) 
0.6879 
(0.000) 
1.0755 
(0.000) 
1.4633 
(0.000) 
0.9041 
(0.000) 
1.0697 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.1081 
(0.000) 
0.3753 
(0.000) 
0.1067 
(0.000) 
-0.0688 
(0.004) 
0.0996 
(0.000) 
0.1068 
(0.000) 
L -1.2434 
(0.000) 
-0.7331 
(0.000) 
-1.2820 
(0.000) 
-0.7643 
(0.000) 
-1.3664 
(0.000) 
-1.2771 
(0.000) 
R2 0.653 0.861 0.672 0.863 0.6180 0.650 
F 117881.5 142.4 7673.3 144.0 33513.0 144608.2 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None Fixed None Fixed Random None 
PERIOD EFFECT None None Fixed Fixed None Random 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS EGLS EGLS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
§ 
 
Table 3 
Impact of Globalization 1 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Regressors ZS11 ZS12 ZS21 ZS22 ZS51 ZS52 
CONSTANT -26.0338 
(0.000) 
-26.1183 
(0.000) 
-24.7242 
(0.000) 
-21.9932 
(0.000) 
-26.3579 
(0.000) 
-25.1325 
(0.000) 
YREAL 1.0677 
(0.000) 
1.0688 
(0.000) 
0.8862 
(0.000) 
0.8169 
(0.000) 
1.0856 
(0.000) 
1.0600 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.1083 
(0.000) 
0.1048 
(0.000) 
0.2465 
(0.000) 
0.2820 
(0.000) 
0.0830 
(0.000) 
0.0770 
(0.000) 
L -1.2703 
(0.000) 
-1.2814 
(0.000) 
-0.7099 
(0.000) 
-0.7199 
(0.000) 
-1.3663 
(0.000) 
-1.3747 
(0.000) 
GLOB4 -0.3658 
(0.000) 
-0.1727 
(0.000) 
0.0068 
(0.4486) 
0.0701 
(0.000) 
-0.0820 
(0.000) 
0.0068 
(0.4206) 
GLOBFC -0.5615 
(0.000) 
-0.3682 
(0.000) 
-0.1177 
(0.000) 
-0.0339 
(0.012) 
-0.2525 
(0.000) 
-0.1504 
(0.000) 
GLOB3 -0.7573 
(0.000)  
-0.3444 
(0.000)  
-0.5219 
(0.000)  
GLOB31 
 
-0.7673 
(0.000)  
-0.2156 
(0.000)  
-0.4141 
(0.000) 
R2 0.667 0.669 0.861 0.861 0.650 0.649 
F 62722.5 63108.5 143.0 142.7 18093.3 17984.4 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None Fixed Fixed Random Random 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS EGLS EGLS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 4 
Impact of Globalization 2 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
GLOBVAR GLOB3 GLOB31 GLOB3 GLOB31 GLOB3 GLOB31 
Regressors ZS11Y ZS12Y ZS21Y ZS22Y ZS51Y ZS52Y 
CONSTANT -20.7466 (0.000) 
-21.9434 
(0.000) 
-24.5057 
(0.000) 
-22.0897 
(0.000) 
-25.0543 
(0.000) 
-24.4133 
(0.000) 
YREAL 0.9585 (0.000) 
0.9837 
(0.000) 
0.8916 
(0.000) 
0.8228 
(0.000) 
1.0631 
(0.000) 
1.0502 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.1066 (0.000) 
0.1018 
(0.000) 
0.2181 
(0.000) 
0.2711 
(0.000) 
0.0710 
(0.000) 
0.0639 
(0.000) 
L -1.2708 (0.000) 
-1.2827 
(0.000) 
-0.7124 
(0.000) 
-0.7212 
(0.000) 
-1.3679 
(0.000) 
-1.3768 
(0.000) 
GLOB4 -4.3083 (0.000) 
-2.7931 
(0.000) 
0.5357 
(0.001) 
0.4205 
(0.000) 
-0.1712 
(0.296) 
-0.1479 
(0.000) 
GLOBFC -6.6850 (0.000) 
-5.1702 
(0.000) 
-0.7256 
(0.003) 
-0.7904 
(0.000) 
-1.7420 
(0.000) 
-1.7171 
(0.000) 
GLOBVAR -5.7072 (0.000) 
-5.9588 
(0.000) 
-1.4197 
(0.000) 
-0.4698 
(0.000) 
-2.2196 
(0.000) 
-1.7562 
(0.000) 
GLOB4 x YREAL 0.0803 (0.000) 
0.0533 
(0.000) 
-0.0109 
(0.001) 
-0.0072 
(0.000) 
0.0017 
(0.601) 
0.0030 
(0.000) 
GLOBFC x YREAL 0.1233 (0.000) 
0.0963 
(0.000) 
0.0120 
(0.012) 
0.0151 
(0.000) 
0.0297 
(0.000) 
0.0313 
(0.000) 
GLOBVAR x YREAL 0.1030 (0.000) 
0.1070 
(0.000) 
0.0219 
(0.000) 
0.0051 
(0.000) 
0.0351 
(0.000) 
0.0274 
(0.000) 
R2 0.670 0.672 0.861 0.861 0.651 0.651 
F 42280.6 42581.3 143.0 142.6 12158.6 12091.7 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None Fixed Fixed Random Random 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS EGLS EGLS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
§ 
Table 5 
Impact of Globalization 3 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
GLOBVAR GLOB3 GLOB31 GLOB3 GLOB31 GLOB3 GLOB31 
Regressors ZS11B ZS12B ZS21B ZS22B ZS51B ZS52B 
CONSTANT -20.2458 (0.000) 
-21.6620 
(0.000) 
-20.1781 
(0.000) 
-17.8863 
(0.000) 
-23.5974 
(0.000) 
-23.1138 
(0.000) 
YREAL 0.9065 (0.000) 
0.9489 
(0.000) 
0.7205 
(0.000) 
0.6583 
(0.000) 
0.9835 
(0.000) 
0.9830 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.2341 (0.000) 
0.1915 
(0.000) 
0.4853 
(0.000) 
0.5180 
(0.000) 
0.2220 
(0.000) 
0.1875 
(0.000) 
L -1.2751 (0.000) 
-1.2870 
(0.000) 
-0.7567 
(0.000) 
-0.7485 
(0.000) 
-1.3742 
(0.000) 
-1.3833 
(0.000) 
GLOB4 -4.8037 (0.000) 
-3.1530 
(0.000) 
0.2545 
(0.125) 
0.1916 
(0.264) 
-0.5753 
(0.000) 
-0.4405 
(0.010) 
GLOBFC -7.0531 (0.000) 
-5.4017 
(0.000) 
-0.9650 
(0.000) 
-0.9788 
(0.000) 
-2.0992 
(0.000) 
-1.9678 
(0.000) 
GLOBVAR -6.1424 (0.000) 
-6.2887 
(0.000) 
-1.5338 
(0.000) 
-0.3556 
(0.045) 
-2.5734 
(0.000) 
-1.9831 
(0.000) 
GLOB4 x YREAL 0.1245 (0.000) 
0.0836 
(0.000) 
0.0251 
(0.000) 
0.0177 
(0.000) 
0.0384 
(0.000) 
0.0274 
(0.000) 
GLOBFC x YREAL 0.1546 (0.000) 
0.1138 
(0.000) 
0.0497 
(0.000) 
0.0428 
(0.000) 
0.0647 
(0.000) 
0.0546 
(0.000) 
GLOBVAR x YREAL 0.1509 (0.000) 
0.1499 
(0.000) 
0.0709 
(0.000) 
0.0500 
(0.000) 
0.0816 
(0.000) 
0.0721 
(0.000) 
GLOB4 x YPCREAL -0.1022 (0.000) 
-0.0688 
(0.000) 
-0.0890 
(0.000) 
-0.0595 
(0.000) 
-0.0851 
(0.000) 
-0.0548 
(0.000) 
GLOBFC x YPCREAL -0.0715 (0.000) 
-0.0383 
(0.000) 
-0.0957 
(0.000) 
-0.0692 
(0.000) 
-0.0819 
(0.000) 
-0.0539 
(0.000) 
GLOBVAR x YPCREAL -0.1172 (0.000) 
-0.1086 
(0.000) 
-0.1355 
(0.000) 
-0.1371 
(0.000) 
-0.1170 
(0.000) 
-0.1188 
(0.000) 
R2 0.671 0.673 0.862 0.862 0.652 0.651 
F 31896.7 32120.7 144.2 144.1 9260.5 9229.1 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None Fixed Fixed Random Random 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS EGLS EGLS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 6 
Revealed Functioning of Economic Regions 
A. Bilateral linkages between countries (basis points) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 EU15 ONLY 180          
2 EU15-MEDITERRANEAN 106 46         
3 MEDITERRANEAN ONLY 67 39 21        
4 MEDITERRANEAN – OIC COUNTRIES 119 80 36 129       
5 OIC COUNTRIES ONLY 314 167 41 193 490      
6 OIC COUNTRIES – EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 57 28 23 28 62 15     
7 EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ONLY 309 147 119 175 338 131 598    
8 EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 188 90 54 116 392 59 268 155   
9 LATIN-CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 304 175 49 64 188 13 242 338 763  
10 OTHER COUNTRIES 340 157 52 108 435 57 255 317 242 520 
 
B. Bilateral linkages between countries (multiples of the minimum, rounded up) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 EU15 ONLY 14          
2 EU15-MEDITERRANEAN 8 4         
3 MEDITERRANEAN ONLY 5 3 2        
4 MEDITERRANEAN – OIC COUNTRIES 9 6 3 10       
5 OIC COUNTRIES ONLY 24 13 3 15 38      
6 OIC COUNTRIES – EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 4 2 2 2 5 1     
7 EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ONLY 24 11 9 14 26 10 46    
8 EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 15 7 4 9 30 5 21 12   
9 LATIN-CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 24 14 4 5 15 1 19 26 59  
10 OTHER COUNTRIES 26 12 4 8 34 4 20 25 19 40 
 
C. Bilateral linkages between countries (percentage of number of country pairs in trading regions) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 EU15 ONLY 78          
2 EU15-MEDITERRANEAN 82 90         
3 MEDITERRANEAN ONLY 52 60 40        
4 MEDITERRANEAN – OIC COUNTRIES 58 78 35 89       
5 OIC COUNTRIES ONLY 53 57 14 41 38      
6 OIC COUNTRIES – EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 44 44 36 28 21 30     
7 EX-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES ONLY 55 52 42 39 26 46 50    
8 EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 81 78 47 63 73 51 53 83   
9 LATIN-CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 54 62 17 14 14 5 19 66 64  
10 OTHER COUNTRIES 63 58 19 25 35 21 21 65 20 48 
Note: In Panel A, counts of positive fixed effects are re-scaled to sum up to 10,000. In Panel B, counts are represented as 
multiples of the minimum count. In Panel C, the positive fixed effect counts are divided by the maximum possible number of 
bilateral relationships between the countries of trading regions. 
§
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Table 7 
Regions and Foreign Trade 1 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Region (REG) ASIA EU EXCOM LAT MED OIC 
Regressors 3ZS11 3ZS12 3ZS13 3ZS14 3ZS15 3ZS16 
CONSTANT -25.5247 (0.000) 
-25.4487 
(0.000) 
-24.6019 
(0.000) 
-27.034 
(0.000) 
-25.3436 
(0.000) 
-24.7441 
(0.000) 
YREAL 1.0290 (0.000) 
1.0386 
(0.000) 
1.0346 
(0.000) 
1.0369 
(0.000) 
1.0422 
(0.000) 
1.0404 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.1197 (0.000) 
0.1049 
(0.000) 
0.0935 
(0.000) 
0.1172 
(0.000) 
0.1130 
(0.000) 
0.0758 
(0.000) 
L -1.2263 (0.000) 
-1.2553 
(0.000) 
-1.2868 
(0.000) 
-1.0690 
(0.000) 
-1.2868 
(0.000) 
-1.2666 
(0.000) 
REG-REG 0.5011 (0.000) 
-0.1193 
(0.000) 
0.0442 
(0.000) 
0.5607 
(0.000) 
-0.4984 
(0.000) 
-0.4525 
(0.000) 
REG-NON-REG 0.0968 (0.000) 
0.0874 
(0.000) 
-0.8149 
(0.000) 
-0.5155 
(0.000) 
-0.4019 
(0.000) 
-0.4735 
(0.000) 
R2 0.655 0.654 0.662 0.658 0.656 0.657 
F 71163.9 70796.2 73492.3 72189.6 71544.1 72001.0 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None None None None None 
PERIOD EFFECT None None None None None None 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS LS LS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
§ 
 
Table 8 
Regions and Foreign Trade 2 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Region (REG) ASIA EU EXCOM LAT MED OIC 
Regressors 3ZS11 3ZS12 3ZS13 3ZS14 3ZS15 3ZS16 
CONSTANT -24.0170 (0.000) 
-24.0194 
(0.000) 
-24.8534 
(0.000) 
-27.6444 
(0.000) 
-24.7594 
(0.000) 
-24.9933 
(0.000) 
YREAL 1.0225 (0.000) 
1.0435 
(0.000) 
1.0345 
(0.000) 
1.0395 
(0.000) 
1.0428 
(0.000) 
1.0408 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.1259 (0.000) 
0.1074 
(0.000) 
0.0910 
(0.000) 
0.1191 
(0.000) 
0.1147 
(0.000) 
0.0756 
(0.000) 
L -1.3778 (0.000) 
-1.4497 
(0.000) 
-1.2532 
(0.000) 
-1.0154 
(0.000) 
-1.3600 
(0.000) 
-1.2396 
(0.000) 
REG-REG -1.6993 (0.000) 
-4.5856 
(0.000) 
5.1167 
(0.000) 
7.7320 
(0.000) 
-2.6842 
(0.000) 
0.6187 
(0.000) 
REG-NON-REG -4.3984 (0.000) 
-4.2947 
(0.000) 
-0.3245 
(0.0035) 
-0.6718 
(0.000) 
-2.7456 
(0.000) 
0.1741 
(0.143) 
REG-REG x L 0.2636 (0.000) 
0.5734 
(0.000) 
-0.6547 
(0.000) 
-0.9128 
(0.000) 
0.2841 
(0.000) 
-0.1295 
(0.000) 
REG-NON-REG x L 0.5101 (0.000) 
0.5023 
(0.000) 
-0.0569 
(0.000) 
0.0119 
(0.658) 
0.2730 
(0.000) 
-0.0745 
(0.000) 
R2 0.657 0.656 0.663 0.660 0.657 0.657 
F 51391.8 51203.4 52666.5 51997.9 51272.5 51449.2 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None None None None None 
PERIOD EFFECT None None None None None None 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS LS LS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 9 
Role of Institutions 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Regressors 4ZS1 4ZS2 4ZS3 4ZS4 4ZS5 4ZS6 
CONSTANT -24.7165 (0.000) 
-17.9807 
(0.000) 
-25.3505 
(0.000) 
-50.9095 
(0.000) 
-20.2441 
(0.000) 
-24.9702 
(0.000) 
YREAL 1.0272 (0.000) 
0.7253 
(0.000) 
1.0597 
(0.000) 
1.5566 
(0.000) 
0.9216 
(0.000) 
1.0494 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.1107 (0.000) 
0.3860 
(0.000) 
0.0985 
(0.000) 
-0.0889 
(0.000) 
0.1319 
(0.000) 
0.1027 
(0.000) 
L -1.2584 (0.000) 
-0.9109 
(0.000) 
-1.2926 
(0.000) 
-0.9335 
(0.000) 
-1.3528 
(0.000) 
-1.2830 
(0.000) 
DURABLE 0.0186 (0.000) 
-0.0017 
(0.444) 
0.0534 
(0.000) 
0.0005 
(0.832) 
-0.0077 
(0.000) 
0.0435 
(0.000) 
POLITY -0.0906 (0.000) 
0.1341 
(0.000) 
-0.2766 
(0.000) 
0.1132 
(0.000) 
0.1542 
(0.000) 
-0.2249 
(0.000) 
DIRECPOLITY -0.1477 (0.005) 
0.3954 
(0.000) 
-0.6149 
(0.000) 
0.3114 
(0.000) 
0.4308 
(0.000) 
-0.4824 
(0.000) 
POLITY x DIRECPOLITY 0.0564 (0.000) 
-0.1376 
(0.000) 
0.2081 
(0.000) 
-0.0876 
(0.000) 
-0.1449 
(0.000) 
0.1652 
(0.000) 
R2 0.663 0.860 0.680 0.863 0.635 0.660 
F 45967.2 144.1 6429.0 146.1 14152.9 59077.9 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None Fixed None Fixed Random None 
PERIOD EFFECT None None Fixed Fixed None Random 
OBS 163310 163310 163310 163310 163310 163310 
 LS LS LS LS EGLS EGLS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 10 
Effects of Culture on Foreign Trade 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Regressors 5ZS1 5ZS11 5ZS3 5ZS31 5ZS5 5ZS51 5ZS6 5ZS61 
CONSTANT -26.8589 (0.000) 
-26.8876 
(0.000) 
-28.1557 
(0.000) 
-28.1798 
(0.000) 
-19.4163 
(0.000) 
-19.4196 
(0.000) 
-27.7043 
(0.000) 
-27.7270 
(0.000) 
YREAL 1.0486 (0.000) 
1.0480 
(0.000) 
1.0837 
(0.000) 
1.0829 
(0.000) 
0.9106 
(0.000) 
0.9101 
(0.000) 
1.0768 
(0.000) 
1.0759 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.1204 (0.000) 
0.1219 
(0.000) 
0.1195 
(0.000) 
0.1212 
(0.000) 
0.0974 
(0.000) 
0.0977 
(0.000) 
0.1195 
(0.000) 
0.1212 
(0.000) 
L -1.1831 (0.000) 
-1.1765 
(0.000) 
-1.2279 
(0.000) 
-1.2204 
(0.000) 
-1.2943 
(0.000) 
-1.2885 
(0.000) 
-1.2203 
(0.000) 
-1.2129 
(0.000) 
DSAMERLG -0.1026 (0.000) 
-0.1604 
(0.000) 
-0.1205 
(0.000) 
-0.1829 
(0.000) 
0.0905 
(0.035) 
0.0318 
(0.447) 
-0.1152 
(0.000) 
-0.1767 
(0.000) 
DSAMELNG 2.0832 (0.000) 
1.1959 
(0.000) 
2.0717 
(0.000) 
1.1107 
(0.000) 
2.3467 
(0.000) 
1.2878 
(0.000) 
2.0715 
(0.000) 
1.1248 
(0.000) 
DSAMERLG x DSAMELNG -1.0625 (0.000)  
-1.1513 
(0.000)  
-1.2880 
(0.000)  
-1.1344 
(0.000)  
R2 0.664 0.663 0.682 0.681 0.629 0.628 0.662 0.661 
F 61921.2 73937.2 7573.8 7673.3 17182.8 20565.4 76870.0 91841.7 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None None None Random Random None None 
PERIOD EFFECT None None Fixed Fixed None None Random Random 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS EGLS EGLS EGLS EGLS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 11 
Effects of Regions and Culture on Foreign Trade 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Region (REG) EU MED MED EU MED MED 
Regressors 6ZS11 6ZS12 6ZS120 6ZS31 6ZS32 6ZS320 
CONSTANT -26.8784 (0.000) 
-26.8387 
(0.000) 
-25.1540 
(0.000) 
-28.1465 
(0.000) 
-28.1182 
(0.000) 
-26.5501 
(0.000) 
YREAL 1.0502 (0.000) 
1.0543 
(0.000) 
1.0401 
(0.000) 
1.0856 
(0.000) 
1.0910 
(0.000) 
1.0785 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.0986 (0.000) 
0.1179 
(0.000) 
0.1156 
(0.000) 
0.1017 
(0.000) 
0.1170 
(0.000) 
0.1171 
(0.000) 
L -1.1627 (0.000) 
-1.2072 
(0.000) 
-1.2943 
(0.000) 
-1.2181 
(0.000) 
-1.2613 
(0.000) 
-1.3471 
(0.000) 
REG-REG 0.1173 (0.000) 
-0.3427 
(0.000) 
-0.6324 
(0.000) 
-0.0066 
(0.731) 
-0.5195 
(0.000) 
-0.8195 
(0.000) 
REG-NON-REG 0.1558 (0.000) 
-0.3459 
(0.000) 
-0.5345 
(0.000) 
0.1174 
(0.000) 
-0.4062 
(0.000) 
-0.6037 
(0.000) 
DSAMELNG 1.0375 (0.000) 
1.0933 
(0.000)  
0.9314 
(0.000) 
0.9701 
(0.000)  
DSAMERLG 
  
-0.1239 
(0.000)   
-0.1776 
(0.000) 
REG-REG x DSAMELNG 0.7824 (0.000) 
-0.4982 
(0.000)  
0.8691 
(0.000) 
-0.2492 
(0.015)  
REG-NON-REG x DSAMELNG 0.5907 (0.000) 
0.0780 
(0.048)  
0.5749 
(0.000) 
0.1555 
(0.000)  
REG-REG x DSAMERLG 
  
0.2589 
(0.000)   
0.3317 
(0.000) 
REG-NON-REG x DSAMERLG   0.2644 (0.000)   
0.2912 
(0.000) 
R2 0.664 0.665 0.657 0.681 0.683 0.676 
F 46350.9 46503.2 44778.9 7264.7 7320.3 7099.7 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None None Fixed Fixed Fixed 
PERIOD EFFECT None None None None None None 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS LS LS LS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
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Table 12 
Effects of Regions and Culture on Foreign Trade (continued) 
Dependent Variable: TRDREAL 
Region (REG) EU MED MED EU MED MED EU 
Regressors 6ZS51 6ZS52 6ZS520 6ZS61 6ZS62 6ZS620 7Z 
CONSTANT -20.9151 (0.000) 
-19.0727 
(0.000) 
-18.1626 
(0.000) 
-27.7066 
(0.000) 
-27.6736 
(0.000) 
-26.0864 
(0.000) 
-26.4070 
(0.000) 
YREAL 0.9248 (0.000) 
0.9093 
(0.000) 
0.9059 
(0.000) 
1.0787 
(0.000) 
1.0840 
(0.000) 
1.0715 
(0.000) 
1.0479 
(0.000) 
YPCREAL 0.0567 (0.000) 
0.1011 
(0.000) 
0.0992 
(0.000) 
0.1009 
(0.000) 
0.1170 
(0.000) 
0.1166 
(0.000) 
0.1111 
(0.000) 
L -1.1566 (0.000) 
-1.3204 
(0.000) 
-1.3923 
(0.000) 
-1.2087 
(0.000) 
-1.2524 
(0.000) 
-1.3384 
(0.000)  
REG-REG 1.1527 (0.000) 
-0.2513 
(0.036) 
-0.4803 
(0.002) 
0.0179 
(0.347) 
-0.4863 
(0.000) 
-0.7837 
(0.000) 
-1.2112 
(0.000) 
REG-NON-REG 0.6950 (0.000) 
-0.2639 
(0.000) 
-0.4519 
(0.000) 
0.1257 
(0.000) 
-0.3945 
(0.000) 
-0.5891 
(0.000) 
0.0007 
(0.963) 
DSAMELNG 1.4452 (0.000) 
1.3233 
(0.000)  
0.9495 
(0.000) 
0.9911 
(0.000)  
1.1428 
(0.000) 
DSAMERLG 
  
0.0511 
(0.308)   
-0.1656 
(0.000) 
-0.2976 
(0.000) 
REG-REG x DSAMELNG 0.1068 (0.648) 
-0.5420 
(0.000)  
0.8542 
(0.000) 
-0.2949 
(0.004)   
REG-NON-REG x DSAMELNG 0.4714 (0.001) 
-0.2018 
(0.000)  
0.5791 
(0.000) 
0.1411 
(0.000)  
0.4912 
(0.000) 
REG-REG x DSAMERLG 
  
0.3044 
(0.204)   
0.3162 
(0.000)  
REG-NON-REG x DSAMERLG   0.3036 (0.001)   
0.2837 
(0.000) 
0.3014 
(0.000) 
R2 0.630 0.629 0.619 0.661 0.662 0.653 0.665 
F 12937.1 12893.3 12640.7 57354.9 57642.3 55798.8 46521.1 
CROSS-SECTION EFFECT None None None Random Random Random None 
PERIOD EFFECT Fixed Fixed Fixed None None None Random 
OBS 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 187207 
 LS LS LS EGLS EGLS EGLS EGLS 
Note: p-values are given in parentheses. White diagonal standard errors and covariance. 
 
 
 
